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INTRODUCTION

In a time when the nation’s water agencies and developers have
gone to great lengths to “tap and reroute water to quench the thirst
of expanding suburban communities,” an interesting question has
1
surfaced. Is the discharge of a pollutant from a canal through a
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Felicity Barringer, Water Pump Case Tests Federal Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004,
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pumping station into a “navigable water,” such as a wetland, like
taking a spoonful of soup from one bowl and passing it into another;
or is such a discharge as “[i]f one takes a ladle of soup from a pot,
lifts it above the pot, and pours it back into the pot, [without having]
4
‘added’ soup or anything else to the pot?” In March of 2004, the
United States Supreme Court decided South Florida Water Management
5
District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, holding that the federal Clean
6
Water Act (“CWA”) and its permitting requirements apply to point
7
sources that do not themselves generate pollutants. The Court,
however, declined to answer whether the engineered movement of
water from one “navigable water” to another requires compliance
8
with the CWA. The Court stated that a permit under the CWA is not
necessary when a pollutant from one body of water is added to
another body of water that is not “meaningfully distinct” from the
9
first. The question of what constitutes “meaningfully distinct” was
10
left open for remand, and the various circuits will inevitably have to
develop their own definitions in order to determine whether or not
certain water diversion facilities are subject to the permitting
regulations of the CWA.
Miccosukee involved a canal which pumped polluted water into a
11
natural wetland.
The Supreme Court remanded the case for
12
further development of the Government’s “unitary waters” theory.
According to this theory, all “navigable waters” of the United States
2

33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000) (defining “navigable waters” as “the waters of the
United States”).
3
A “wetland” may fall within the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act. See United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 124 (1985) (concluding that a
definition of “waters of the United States” includes wetlands adjacent to other bodies
of water).
The term “wetlands” means those areas that are inundated or saturated
by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to
support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a
prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil
conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and
similar areas.
Id. (citing 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1978)).
4
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. New York, 273 F.3d
481, 492 (2d Cir. 2001).
5
541 U.S. 95 (2004).
6
See infra notes 38–47 and accompanying text.
7
Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 105.
8
Id. at 112.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 99–100.
12
Id. at 104–12.
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should be viewed unitarily and, therefore, a CWA permit would not
be required when “one navigable water body is discharged, unaltered,
13
If courts accept this theory,
into another navigable water body.”
“meaningfully distinct” waters will not exist and water diversion
facilities will not likely be subject to the CWA permitting mandates.
There is considerable precedent, however, which may establish that
14
the “unitary waters” theory is incorrect.
If courts find that water diversion facilities do, in fact, connect
“meaningfully distinct” bodies of water, activities never before
15
regulated by the CWA could be subject to permitting requirements.
16
17
Suppliers of drinking water, agricultural irrigation districts, and
18
mineral extraction operations may be among the many required to
obtain permits under the CWA. This may result in disruptions to
their operations, as well as permitting and treatment costs in the

13

Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 104.
See, e.g., Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1299 (1st Cir. 1996)
(holding that the transfer of water from a river through snow-making pipes to a
pond, which resulted in the transfer of pollutants, required a National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System permit because the river and pond were two distinct
“waters of the United States”); Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 481 (holding that New
York City’s use of a tunnel to transfer drinking water from a reservoir into a creek
triggered the Clean Water Act’s permit requirements); N. Plains Res. Council v. Fid.
Exploration and Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The requirement
that the physical, biological, or chemical integrity of the water be a ‘man-induced’
alteration refers to the effect of the discharge on the receiving water; it does not
require that the discharged water be altered by man.”); Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 527 U.S. 99 (2002)
(holding that a pollutant is “added” into wetlands through the process of deep
ripping where the “soil [is] wrenched up, moved around, and redeposited”).
15
Richard Davis & Brian Doster, South Florida Water Management District v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians: Supreme Court Considers Extending Clean Water Act Regulation,
35 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 91, 92 (Jan. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Davis & Doster].
The court’s decision of the Miccosukee case has the potential to extend
the reach of the Clean Water Act to activities and industries historically
exempt from regulation under that statute. Moreover, by its decision
of the case, the court could restructure legal responsibilities and
economic relationships in ways that could scarcely have been
contemplated by the framers of the act.
Id.
16
“Suppliers of drinking water . . . often move water from basins in which it is
plentiful to basins in which need exceeds supply.” Id. at 91–92.
17
“[A]gricultural irrigation districts frequently move water from basin to basin to
allow productive use of fertile but arid lands.” Id. Furthermore, Congress has
exempted “agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated
agriculture” from the definition of “point source.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000).
18
See Davis & Doster, supra note 15, at 91.
14
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hundreds of millions of dollars.
Costs could be passed on to
farmers and ranchers who will either have to increase their own costs
and lose competitiveness, or move away from certain practices and
20
products altogether. A more regulated permitting requirement for
water diversion facilities would also raise issues of federalism and the
21
powers of the states to regulate their own environmental laws. It
may be argued that such permitting requirements interfere with the
states’ sovereign prerogatives to manage their own water resources
22
and meet the interests and needs of their own citizens.
These controversies all revolve around the fundamental issue of
whether or not a water diversion facility connects two bodies of water
that are “meaningfully distinct.” It appears that the only argument
which may save these facilities from permitting requirements under
23
the CWA is the “unitary waters” theory raised in Miccosukee. Unless
courts favor strong public policy arguments, however, or unless
Congress decides to expressly exempt water diversion facilities from
24
the permitting requirements, it is likely that these facilities will have

19

Id. at 92.
The additional costs of compliance with the Clean Water Act will have
to be absorbed somewhere—whether they are borne by those who
move water from one watershed to another, passed back upstream to
the sources of the pollutants, or passed forward to end-users of the
water. Regardless, the movement of these costs through the nation’s
economy can be expected to result in changes, both foreseen and
unforeseeable, that restructure economic relationships at the most
fundamental level.

Id.
20

See id. at 97.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000).
22
See id. § 1370.
23
The “unitary waters” theory may also potentially impact decisions that have
held hydroelectric or dam facilities not subject to CWA permitting requirements
because they do not add pollutants to a waterway. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v.
Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 590 (6th Cir. 1988); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v.
Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
24
Even when the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) was faced with
issuing “millions of applications” and argued that Congress “could not have intended
to impose such burdens,” it was held that the EPA Administrator does not have the
authority to exempt any categories of “point sources” from permit requirements.
NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Therefore, the court could
not acquiesce to the Agency’s sympathetic pleas, concluding that only Congress
could create such exemptions. Id. (“This is a proper task for the Legislature where
the public interest may be considered from the multifaceted points of view of the
representational process.”).
21
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to spend millions of dollars to comply with the CWA, leaving both
25
urban and rural communities to suffer the consequences.
This Comment will explore how a court may define
“meaningfully distinct” in light of the “unitary waters” theory posited
by the Government in Miccosukee.
It will also discuss the
consequences of subjecting water diversion facilities to the strict
permitting requirements of the CWA. Part II will provide an overview
26
of the central issues of Miccosukee,
while Part III will
comprehensively analyze the “unitary waters” theory, as well as the
27
arguments against it. Part IV will consider the many consequences
of imposing permitting requirements on water diversion facilities,
28
should the “unitary waters” theory be rejected. Part V will look to
whether such permitting requirements will undermine essential
aspects of the CWA, including the agricultural exemption and
29
Finally, Part VI will attempt to
sovereign powers of the states.
explore the next logical steps and possible resolution to the queries
30
raised in Miccosukee.
II. DIVERTING THE ISSUES IN MICCOSUKEE
A. The Clean Water Act
A brief overview of the CWA is essential to fully understand the
significant issues and arguments raised in Miccosukee. In 1972,
Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, now
known, along with its amendments, as the CWA. The CWA’s purpose
25

Drew Douglas, Environment: Requiring Permit for Everglades Pumping May Slow
Restoration, Solicitor General Says, DAILY RPT. FOR EXECUTIVES: REG. & LAW (BNA), No.
178, at A-26 (Sept. 15, 2003). As stated by Nicolas Gutierrez, the District’s chairman:
We’re already well on the way to cleaning up the Everglades. Yet
today’s progress could be diverted—or even reversed—if the law is
wrongly applied, and if new procedures are added to existing
regulations. Unless the lower court’s misreading of the law is
overturned, there will be serious national consequences for the
environment and the economy. . . . If we win this case, the real winner
will be our nation’s environment, which will enjoy a faster and more
effective cleanup. But if we lose this case, the real losers will be the
nation’s taxpayers, who will see their scarce resources frittered away on
needless bureaucratic paperwork instead of practical measures that
protect our environment.
Id.
26
See infra Part II.
27
See infra Part III.
28
See infra Part IV.
29
See infra Part V.
30
See infra Part VI.
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is to respond, comprehensively, as a matter of national policy, to the
complex problem of restoring and maintaining the “chemical,
31
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” The CWA
generally prohibits the discharge of any pollutant by any person into
certain waters and “effectively creates a five-part jurisdictional test: Is
there (1) an addition (2) of a pollutant (3) to the navigable waters
32
(4) from a point source (5) by a person?”
One of the most
challenging aspects of the CWA is understanding its many
definitional complexities, yet this must be overcome in order to apply
the CWA to particular circumstances.
The CWA defines “pollutant” as “dredged spoil, solid waste,
incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions,
chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat,
wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and
33
industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.”
The phrase “discharge of a pollutant” is defined as “any addition of
34
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”
Furthermore, the CWA defines “navigable waters” as “the waters of
35
the United States.”
The CWA distinguishes between point sources and non-point
sources. A “point source” is “any discernable, confined and discrete
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel,
tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock,
concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating
36
craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” Congress
determined that federally mandated permitting programs are
appropriate responses for addressing the addition of pollutants to the
waters of the United States from “point sources” but that tailored
37
state regulations are more appropriate for non-point sources.

31

33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000). Though the CWA establishes an important role for
the federal government, it also recognizes the primary responsibilities of the
individual states to protect water quality and to manage water resources, including
“the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction.” Id.
§ 1251(b), (g).
32
Robin Kundis Craig, Beyond SWANCC: The New Federalism and Clean Water Act
Jurisdiction, 33 ENVTL. L. 113, 115 (2003).
33
33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2000).
34
Id. § 1362(12).
35
Id. § 1362(7).
36
Id. § 1362(14).
37
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5,
Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95 (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22137034. “Congress recognized that
a wide variety of human and nonhuman activities affect water quality and that the
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Therefore, the CWA merely encourages states to develop local
38
programs to control the non-point sources of pollution.
Section 402 of the CWA creates the National Pollution Discharge
39
Elimination System (“NPDES”) Program. According to Section 402,
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) or a qualifying
state agency can issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, or
combination of pollutants, upon condition that such discharge will
40
The NPDES program imposes
meet specified requirements.
limitations on a point source discharge by establishing a variety of
41
requirements, including: technology-based effluent limitations,
42
43
water-quality-based effluent limitations, water quality standards,
44
national standards of performance for new point sources, effluent
45
standards for toxic pollutants, pretreatment effluent limitations for
point sources that discharge into publicly owned treatment works
46
47
(“POTWs”), record-keeping and reporting requirements, and
48
ocean discharge criteria.
The CWA has been criticized by many since its enactment.
Some argue that its “command-and-control approaches . . . are simply
old-fashioned—expensive, inefficient, and rigid relics of the big-

government’s response to water pollution must be tailored to the nature of the
activity and the severity of threat.” Id.
38
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(F) (2000) (encouraging a process “to (i)
identify, if appropriate, agriculturally and silviculturally related nonpoint sources of
pollution, including return flows from irrigated agriculture, and their cumulative
effects, runoff from manure disposal areas, and from land used for livestock and
crop production, and (ii) set forth procedures and methods (including land use
requirements) to control to the extent feasible such sources); id. § 1314(f)
(describing the “[i]dentification and evaluation of nonpoint sources of pollution;
processes, procedures, and methods to control pollution”); id. § 1329 (illustrating
non-point source management programs).
39
Id. § 1342. Cf. id. § 1344 (granting the Army Corps of Engineers the authority
to issue “Section 404” permits “for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters at specified disposal sites”).
40
Id. § 1342(a)(1).
41
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2000). Technology-based effluent limitations are
restrictions on “quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological,
and other constituents.” Id. § 1362(11).
42
Id. § 1312(a). Water-quality-based effluent limitations are set when technologybased effluent limitations are inadequate to meet the water quality standards set by
the state. Id. § 1313(a).
43
Id. § 1313(c)(2).
44
Id. § 1316.
45
33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (2000).
46
Id. § 1317(b).
47
Id. § 1318.
48
Id. § 1343.
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49

government past.” Others disapprove of “the expansive role given
50
The debates are ongoing, and have
to the federal government.”
pitted the hopeful aspirations of the environmental community
against the independent liberties of the regulated community.
B. The Central and South Florida Flood Control Project
In between South Florida’s coastal hills and the Everglades lies a
“vast array of levees, canals, pumps, and water impoundment areas”
known as the Central and South Florida Flood Control Project
51
(“Project”).
By altering the hydrology of the Everglades and
changing the natural flow of ground and surface water, the Project
sought to ensure flood protection, water conservation, and
52
The South Florida Water Management District
drainage.
(“District”) operates the Project, in particular, a canal called “C-11,” a
pump station known as “S-9,” an undeveloped wetland area called
53
“WCA-3,” and two levees referred to as “L-33” and “L-37.” These are
54
the five essential elements of the Project at issue in Miccosukee.
49

William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today—Has the Clean Water Act Been a
Success?, 55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 539 (2004).
50
Id.
51
Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 99. Florida had built several canals in the early 1900s to
drain the wetlands and make them suitable for cultivation; instead, the canals
lowered the water table, allowed salt water to intrude upon coastal wells, and could
not control flooding. Id. at 99–100. In 1948, Congress responded to these problems
by establishing the Project. Id.
52
Id.
Freshwater systems have been altered since historical times; however,
the pace of change accelerated markedly in the early 20th century.
Rivers and lakes have been modified by altering waterways, draining
wetlands, constructing dams and irrigation channels, and establishing
connections between water basins, such as canals and pipelines, to
transfer water. Although these changes have brought increased farm
output, flood control, and hydropower, they have also radically
changed the natural hydrological cycle in most of the world’s water
basins.
World Resources Institute, A Guide to World Resources 2000-2001: People and Ecosystems:
The Fraying Web of Life, at 103 (2001), available at http://pdf.wri.org/wr2000_
chapter2_full.pdf.
The devastating, if not fully intended, consequences of the . . . Project's
operation over the intervening fifty years have included widespread
destruction of the natural Everglades system. The Everglades now
occupy less than half the area of its historic pre-drainage wetland, and
the remaining half of the natural system shows symptoms of serious
ecological decline.
Mary Doyle & Donald Jodrey, Everglades Restoration: Forging New Law in Allocating
Water Environment, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 255, 260 (2002).
53
Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 100–01.
54
Id.
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C-11 collects groundwater and rainwater from urban,
agricultural, and residential areas, and as the water level rises above a
55
certain level, the S-9 pumps water out of the canal and into WCA-3.
L-33 and L-37 slow down return flow by holding back the surface
56
waters of WCA-3. The effect is “to artificially separate the C-11 basin
from WCA-3; left to nature, the two areas would be a single wetland
covered in an undifferentiated body of surface and ground water
57
flowing slowly southward.”
Problems arise when rainwater, falling on the agricultural,
urban, and residential land, absorbs contaminants produced by
58
human activities before entering into the C-11 canal.
The C-11
water, consequently, contains high levels of phosphorous, which is
59
found in fertilizers used by farmers.
This water is then pumped
across the levees into WCA-3, altering the balance of its ecosystem
and stimulating the growth of algae and plants foreign to the
60
Everglades ecosystem. Since the plants and animals native to the
Everglades have adapted to the very low phosphorous conditions, any
phosphorous enrichment in the area can cause impacts such as “loss
of water column dissolved oxygen, loss of native plant life
(periphyton (micro-algae) and macrophytes), and loss of preferred
61
foraging habitat for wading birds.”
C. The Clean Water Act Claims
The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians and the Friends of the
Everglades brought a citizens’ suit against the District, claiming that
55

Id. WCA-3 used to be part of the original South Florida Everglades and is now
considered a water conservation area. Id. “The District impounds water in these
areas to conserve fresh water that might otherwise flow directly to the ocean, and to
preserve wetlands habitat.” Id.
56
Id. at 101.
57
Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 101.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Memorandum from Dan Scheidt, Senior Scientist of the South Florida
Initiative, to the Director of the Water Management Division 4 (May 20, 1999),
available at http://www.epa.gov/region4/southflorida/miccosukee/memo1.pdf.
The Florida Legislature attempted to remedy these problems by passing the
Everglades Forever Act (“EFA”) in 1994, after the federal government sued the
Florida Department of Environmental Regulation and the South Florida Water
Management District. See FLA. STAT. § 373.4592 (1994); United States v. S. Fla. Water
Mgmt. Dist., 847 F. Supp. 1567, 1569 (S.D. Fla. 1992). The EFA required the
building of Storm Water Treatment Areas on the southern border of the Everglades
Agricultural Area (“EAA”) to absorb phosphorous-containing waters from flowing
directly from the EAA into the Everglades. See FLA. STAT. § 373.4592 (2002).
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the District could not operate the S-9 pump without an NPDES
permit under Section 402 of the Clean Water Act because the pump
62
station moved phosphorous-laden water from C-11 into WCA-3.
Arguing that this conveyance was the “discharge of a pollutant” from
“any point source,” the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the operation of S-9
63
and, therefore, the conveyance of water from C-11 into WCA-3. The
district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment,
concluding that C-11 waters and the Everglades were “two separate
bodies of water because the transfer of water or its contents from C64
11 into the Everglades would not occur naturally.”
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion
65
that pollutants were indeed being added to WCA-3.
The District
argued that a point source must add pollutants from the outside
66
world in order for there to be an addition of a pollutant.
Nevertheless, the court considered whether, “but for the point
67
source,” the pollutants would have been added to the Everglades.
Believing that C-11 water would not flow into WCA-3 without the S-9
pump station, the Eleventh Circuit held that as the cause-in-fact of
the addition of pollutants, the S-9 pump station required an NPDES
68
Although determining that a permit was required, the
permit.
Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment awarding an
69
injunction. The court recognized that an injunction would result in
the cessation of the S-9 pump, causing substantial flooding and the
62

Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 102. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000) (citizen suit provision).
The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians has been quite active in the battle to decrease the
amount of phosphorous in the Everglades. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, Final
Admin. Order (DOAH, 2004) (No. 03-2872RP), available at http://www.doah.state.
fl.us/ros/2003/03%2D2872%2Epdf.
In July 2003, Florida’s Environmental
Regulation Committee (“ERC”) issued a ruling, adopting a default standard of ten
parts per billion for phosphorous and incorporating certain testing criteria and
moderating provisions. Id. The Miccosukee Indians immediately brought an
administrative challenge, claiming that the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection exceeded its authority and calling into question most of the testing
criteria. Id.
63
Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 103.
64
Id. (quoting Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28a–29a, Miccosukee,
541 U.S. 95 (No. 02-626)).
65
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364, 1368
(11th Cir. 2002).
66
Id. at 1367. (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 175 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (giving deference to EPA’s interpretation that “[an] addition from a point
source occurs only if the point source itself physically introduces a pollutant into
water from the outside world”)).
67
Id. at 1368.
68
Id. at 1369.
69
Id. at 1371.
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70

displacement of many people.
In light of these “disastrous
consequences,” the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court
should order the District to obtain an NPDES permit within a
71
reasonable period of time. If the District failed to comply with this
order, the plaintiffs could then rely on the “various enforcement
mechanisms available under the CWA, such as fines and criminal
72
penalties.”
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and first
considered whether the pumping of water by the District, which
added nothing to the water being pumped, constituted an “addition”
of a pollutant from a point source, thereby triggering the need for an
73
NPDES permit.
The District argued that a point source only
requires an NPDES permit “when a pollutant originates from the
74
point source,” not when it merely passes through the point source.
Writing for a nearly unanimous Court, Justice O’Connor rejected the
District’s argument as “untenable” and held that “a point source need
not be the original source of the pollutant; it need only convey the
75
pollutant to ‘navigable waters.’”
While holding that the definition of “discharge of a pollutant”
included within its reach “point sources that do not themselves
generate pollutants,” the Court, nevertheless, remanded the case and
allowed for the development of an argument which was not
76
previously raised before the Eleventh Circuit. The Government’s
“unitary waters” argument views all “navigable waters” unitarily for
purposes of NPDES requirements, and focuses on the definition of a
pollutant discharge as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable
77
waters from any point source.” According to the Government, the
absence of the word “any” prior to the phrase “navigable waters”
indicates “Congress’ understanding that NPDES permits would not
be required for pollution caused by the engineered transfer of one

70

Id. at 1369.
Miccosukee, 280 F.3d at 1370–71.
72
Id. at 1371. See also 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2000). Violations carry fines of up to
$100,000 per day and six years imprisonment. Id. § 1319(c)(2).
73
Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 104.
74
Brief for Petitioner at 20, Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95 (No. 02-626), 2003 WL
22137015.
75
Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 105.
76
Id. at 112.
77
Id. at 105; 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2000).
71
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78

‘navigable water’ to another.” The Supreme Court agreed that an
adoption of the “unitary waters” approach would lead to the
conclusion that the District may operate the S-9 pump station without
79
an NPDES permit, but declined to review or resolve the argument.
Although the Court acknowledged that the Eleventh Circuit
endorsed a test which considered whether the transfer of water
contents would naturally occur, it directly refused to determine
80
Justice Scalia, concurring in the
whether this test was adequate.
judgment, thought that a remand was not necessary because the
Eleventh Circuit had already considered and rejected the “unitary
81
Justice Scalia would have rather left the
waters” argument.
Government’s “unitary waters” theory “to be considered in another
82
case.”
Despite Justice Scalia’s hesitation to further explore the
“unitary waters” theory, courts all over the country will now find
themselves face-to-face with the theory as they decide whether water
diversion facilities connect two “meaningfully distinct” bodies of
water or whether they involve “two hydrologically indistinguishable
83
parts of a single water body.”

78

Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 106.
Congress intended that such pollution instead would be addressed
through local nonpoint source pollution programs.
Section
1314(f)(2)(F), which concerns nonpoint sources, directs the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to give States information on
the evaluation and control of “pollution resulting from . . . changes in
the movement, flow, or circulation of any navigable waters or ground
waters, including changes caused by the construction of dams, levees,
channels, causeways, or flow diversion facilities.
Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f)(2)(F) (2000)) (ellipses in original).
79
Id. at 109.
80
Id. at 111.
81
Id. at 112 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). “That the
argument was not phrased in the same terms or argued with the same clarity does
not mean it was not made.” Id. at 113.
82
Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 112.
83
Id. at 109. “[T]he ‘unitary waters’ argument will now be presented in various
water diversion cases working their way through the courts and citizens suits seeking
injunctive relief against water diversion structures will continue to be filed.” David
Ashton, More Soup: Local Implications of the Supreme Court’s Ruling in South Florida
Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, E-Outlook
Environmental Hot Topics and Legal Updates, Oregon State Bar Environmental &
Natural Resources Section, Issue 1 (2004), at 2, available at http://www.osbenviro.
homestead.com/files/2004issue1.pdf.
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III. WHAT IS “MEANINGFULLY DISTINCT?”
A. The “Unitary Waters” Theory
In Miccosukee, the Government argued that for purposes of
determining whether there had been “any addition of any pollutant
to navigable waters from any point source,” all the water bodies that
fall within the CWA’s definition of “navigable waters” should be
84
viewed “unitarily” for purposes of NPDES requirements. According
to this “unitary waters” theory, since the CWA requires NPDES
permits only where there is an addition of a pollutant “to navigable
waters,” such permits are not required when “water from one
navigable water body is discharged, unaltered, into another navigable
85
water body.” An amicus brief filed by the Government argued that
the pollutants are already in waters of the United States and therefore
cannot be added by a point source that simply transports them to a
86
different location in this network. As stated by the Government,
Section 502(12) cannot reasonably be understood to include an
activity that merely transports navigable waters from one location,
through a “point source,” to another location. Such an activity
can conceivably lead to changes in water quality, but it does not,
within the normal meaning of the relevant terms, constitute an
87
“addition” of any pollutant to “the waters of the United States.”

The Government used statutory interpretation and the CWA’s
88
definitions to support its “unitary waters” argument. By leaving out
the modifier “any” in conjunction with the phrase “navigable waters,”
the Government suggested that Congress consciously chose for “the
waters of the United States” to be viewed as a whole for NPDES
89
requirements. Once a pollutant was present in a segment of “the
waters of the United States,” a “discharge” would not result if it was
90
According to the
merely conveyed to a different water segment.
Government, Congress used the modifier “any” with reference to
“addition,” “pollutant,” and “point source,” and if Congress had
actually intended the phrase “addition of a pollutant” to include the
movement of one navigable water body into another navigable water
body, it would have clearly defined the “discharge of a pollutant” to
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 106.
Id.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 37, at 16.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
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incorporate any addition of any pollutant to “a specific portion” of
91
the navigable waters from any point source.
Existing case law also supports the Government’s “unitary
waters” theory. For instance, the District of Columbia and Sixth
Circuits have held that hydroelectric dams and similar structures do
92
not require NPDES permits.
In National Wildlife Federation v.
93
Gorsuch, the National Wildlife Federation (“NWF”) sought to
94
control changes in water quality resulting from dam operations.
The NWF petitioned the EPA to establish effluent guidelines for
water quality problems caused by dams to waters downstream such as
95
96
oxygen depletion, temperature changes, sediment disruption
97
98
impairing water quality, and gas supersaturation. When the EPA
refused, the NWF filed suit seeking a judicial declaration that the
dam-induced water quality changes should be subject to NPDES
99
permitting requirements.
The NWF argued that an “addition” occurs “when (1) a dam
causes pollutants to enter the reservoir and (2) the polluted water
subsequently passes through the dam—the point source—into the
100
The EPA took the position that
formerly unpolluted river below.”
91

Id. “Congress would not have extended NPDES permitting requirements to
potentially thousands of water diversion facilities without any textual
acknowledgement of that intention.” Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae,
supra note 37, at 19.
92
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 174–75 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 589 (6th Cir. 1988).
93
Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 161.
94
Id.
95
Waters low in oxygen may kill fish and limit a river’s ability to break down
pollutants and other organic matter. See id. If oxygen is completely depleted,
compounds such as iron, manganese, and phosphate “tend to be leached from
bottom muds into the reservoir” which can “harm fish, make the water unpalatable
for drinking, and foster undesirable plant growth.” Id. at 163.
96
Certain species of fish can only survive in warm water, while other species can
only survive in cold water; thus, any changes in water temperature caused by dams
can kill certain species of fish. Id.
97
The plaintiffs argued that the dams will cause the reservoir to fill with
sediment, which “in some cases can require periodic dredging or sluicing.” Id. at
164.
98
Water mixes with the air when it plunges from the reservoir into the
downstream river, causing the downstream river to become “supersaturated,” that is,
“aerated in excess of normal concentration.”
Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 164.
Supersaturated water can be fatal to fish and the plaintiffs became concerned of this
after more than 400,000 fish died of gas bubble disease because of supersaturated gas
caused by spills over the unfinished Harry S. Truman Dam in Missouri. See Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 1291, 1302 (D.D.C. 1982).
99
Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 161.
100
Id. at 174.
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dam releases into downstream receiving waters do not constitute the
“addition” of pollutants, and that dams are non-point sources rather
101
Under the EPA’s view, for there to be an
than point sources.
addition of a pollutant from a point source, “the point source must
introduce the pollutant into navigable water from the outside world;
dam-caused pollution, in contrast, merely passes through the dam
from one body of navigable water (the reservoir) into another (the
102
downstream river).”
The D.C. Circuit extended great deference to
the EPA’s interpretations, noting that “[t]he agency’s construction
must be upheld if . . . it is ‘sufficiently reasonable,’ even if it is not
‘the only reasonable one or even the reading the court would have
103
Although the court stated that the language of the
reached.’”
statute permits either the NWF’s or the EPA’s construction, the D.C.
Circuit reasoned that because Congress indicated that the EPA
should have discretion in defining what constitutes point sources and
pollutants, it also would have intended the EPA to have similar
104
discretion in defining the term “addition.”
Therefore, the D.C.
Circuit upheld the EPA’s interpretation that a point source must
“itself physically introduce[] a pollutant into the water from the
105
outside world.”
The NWF again brought a citizen suit in National Wildlife
106
Federation v. Consumers Power Company against a company that owned
101

Id. at 165.
Id. (emphasis in original).
103
Id. at 171 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 39 (1981)).
104
Id. at 175. It is significant to note that the D.C. Circuit decided Gorsuch just two
years before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, a landmark case in the law of judicial deference. 467 U.S. 837
(1984). The Chevron Court held that where a “statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue [under review], the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. In
order to establish permissibility, courts should determine whether the statute’s
silence or ambiguity represents an explicit or implicit delegation of authority to the
agency to analyze the issue. Id. at 843–44. An explicit statutory gap suggests an
express delegation of authority to the agency to analyze the specific provision of the
statute, and courts should give the legislative regulations controlling weight “unless
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. An implicit
statutory gap also delegates interpretive authority to the agency and “a court may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency.” Id. at 844. Therefore, a court may reject
an agency interpretation not only because it conflicts with the express intentions of
the statute, but also because it is an unreasonable interpretation of an ambiguous
statute. Id.
105
Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 174–75.
106
862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988).
102

WELSH FINAL.DOC

304

10/12/2005 6:51:05 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:289

and operated a hydroelectric facility along the eastern shore of Lake
107
The facility pumped water to a man-made reservoir
Michigan.
during hours of low-cost electricity, allowing the water to drive
108
turbine generators on its return to the Lake during peak hours.
When the pumps withdrew water, and again when the returning
water drove the turbines, fish were drawn through the pumps, killing
109
them and releasing remains into Lake Michigan. The NWF argued
that the release of the fish parts was an addition of a pollutant to
110
Lake Michigan which required an NPDES permit under the CWA.
The EPA argued that an “addition” of a pollutant requires the
111
physical introduction of the pollutant “from the outside world.”
Following Gorsuch’s deferential reasoning, the court accepted the
EPA’s interpretation of “addition” as permissible, stating that the
facility “merely change[d] the movement, flow, or circulation of
navigable waters when it temporarily impound[ed] waters from Lake
Michigan in a storage reservoir, but [did] not alter their character as
112
According to the Sixth Circuit,
waters of the United States.”
“Congress apparently intended that pollution problems caused by
dams and other flow diversion facilities are generally to be regulated
113
by means other than the NPDES permit program.”
The EPA’s interpretations in Gorsuch and Consumers Power both
support the “unitary waters” theory by creating a distinction between
water diversion facilities that merely convey unaltered water and
facilities that have long been subject to permitting requirements

107

Id. at 581.
Id. at 581–82.
109
Id. at 582.
110
Id. at 584. “Millions of pounds of live fish, dead fish and fish remains annually
discharged into Lake Michigan by the Ludington facility are pollutants within the
meaning of the CWA, since they are ‘biological materials.’” Id. at 583; see also Ass’n
of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1980).
111
Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 584.
112
Id. at 589. The court attempted to distinguish such dam facilities from
steam/electric industrial operations which remove water, allowing the water to enter
the industrial complex and absorb heat and other minerals produced by the plant or
electric generator before being added to the waters of the United States. Id. at 589.
113
Id. at 587.
Section 304(f)(2)(F) provides that the EPA shall issue information on
(1) guidelines for identifying and evaluating the nature and extent of
nonpoint sources of pollutants, and (2) processes, procedures, and
methods to control pollution resulting from . . . (F) changes in the
movements, flow, or circulation of any navigable waters or ground
waters, including changes caused by the construction of dams, levees,
channels, causeways, or flow diversion facilities.
Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f)(2)(F) (2000)) (ellipses in original).
108
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because they actually alter the water by adding a pollutant before
114
For instance, both courts noted that if a pumping
conveying it.
station leaks oil, grease, or other pollutants into waters (as opposed to
merely conveying or connecting those waters), that addition is subject
115
to an NPDES permit. Also, Section 402 of the CWA subjects placer
116
of ore deposits in streams and rivers to the NPDES
mining
permitting program because the process results in the excavation and
117
point source discharge of dirt and gravel into navigable waters.
Section 404 of the CWA, which specifically addresses dredged and fill
material, subjects the deposit or redeposit of such material to a
specialized permitting program because that activity results in the
point source discharge of dredged or fill materials into navigable
118
waters.
Also, if water is diverted for an intervening use, the water may
lose its status as “waters of the United States” and consequently
become subject, upon reintroduction into navigable waters, to the
NPDES permitting process. One example of this is if an industrial
user withdraws water from a navigable water body for process or
cooling purposes and returns the water into the same water body
119
Another example is if a facility withdraws
through a point source.
water from a navigable water body, removes preexisting pollutants to
purify the water, and then discharges the removed pollutants
(possibly in a concentrated form) back into the navigable water body
120
while retaining the purified water for use in the facility.

114

See, e.g., Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 586.
To the extent that no more has been shown than that unclean water
flows out of the dam, Congress clearly displayed an intention to
exempt dams from the Clean Water Act. However, if the dam itself
added pollutants to the water, rather than merely transmitting the
water coming into it, in whatever altered form, then it would be subject
to the NPDES permit system.

Id.
115

Id.; Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 165.
Placer mining has been described as “one of four basic methods of mining
metal ores; it involves the mining of alluvial or glacial deposits of loose gravel, sand,
soil, clay, or mud called ‘placers.’ These placers often contain particles of gold and
other heavy minerals.” Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1990).
117
See id. at 1285.
118
See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000); United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 335–36 (4th
Cir. 2000); United States v. M.C.C. of Fla., Inc., 772 F.2d 1501, 1503–06 (11th Cir.
1985); Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 923–25 (5th Cir.
1983).
119
40 C.F.R. §§ 122–125 (2005).
120
See In re City of Phoenix, Ariz. Squaw Peak & Deer Valley Water Treatment
Plants, 9 E.A.D. 515, 2000 WL 1664964 (EPA Envtl. App. Bd. Nov. 1, 2000).
116
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Gorsuch and Consumers Power give the impression that any
pollutant created by or passing through a man-made facility is not an
“addition” to the receiving waters so long as the upstream or
downstream waters were in some way contiguous. Nevertheless, it is
important to recognize that the true holdings of both cases were that
the EPA’s interpretations were reasonable and warranted
121
deference.
Once courts were given the power to interpret the
CWA, in the absence of a reasonable interpretation by the EPA, the
definition of the term “addition” began to change and these
interpretations can now be used to challenge the “unitary waters”
theory.
B. The “Unitary Waters” Theory’s Shortcomings
Although the Supreme Court refused to rule on the “unitary
waters” theory, it did suggest that several NPDES provisions might
122
contradict the theory.
For instance, the CWA appears to protect
not only the “waters of the United States” as a whole, but also
individual water bodies by allowing states to set individualized
123
By setting such water quality
ambient water quality standards.
standards, states take into consideration the designated uses of the
navigable waters involved, as well as the water quality criteria for such
124
waters based upon the uses designated. The water quality standards
directly affect local NPDES permits because if the standard permit
conditions fail to achieve the water quality goals for a given water
body, the state must determine the total pollutant load that the water
body can sustain and then allocate that load among the permit125
For each nonholders who discharge into the water body.
compliant body, states must develop water pollution budgets and
121

But see Brief of Amici Curiae the City of New York et al. in Support of
Petitioner at 27, Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95 (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22220093.
Although in Gorsuch, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that the EPA interpretation was entitled to “great deference,” the
decision itself demonstrates that the court did not simply defer to [the]
EPA. Rather, it contains a detailed analysis of the specific language of
the [CWA] and its legislative history, as well as an evaluation of policy,
weighing the interests of preserving the integrity of the waters of the
United States against the interests of states in water management.
Instead of giving undue deference to the EPA interpretation, the
Gorsuch court labored to ensure that it evaluated the competing
interests of the [CWA] against local water management issues.
Id. (citation omitted).
122
Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 107.
123
33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (2000).
124
Id.
125
Id. § 1313(d).
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remedial pollutant loading allocations, known as “total maximum
daily loads” (“TMDLs”), to address both point and non-point sources
of pollutants in an effort to achieve compliance with applicable water
126
quality standards.
An amicus brief filed by the State of New York in Miccosukee
cautioned against using the “unitary waters” theory, stating that to
adopt such a “dubious theory would be manifestly inconsistent with
the [CWA], and deprive States of effective tools to monitor, maintain,
and achieve water quality consistent with the designated use and
water quality criteria applicable to each individual water body within
127
It was further noted by the respondents that
their borders.”
Congress had exempted only two categories in its definition of the
terms “pollutant”:
(A) ‘sewage from vessels or a discharge incidental to the normal
operation of a vessel of the Armed Forces’ . . . ; [and] (B) water,
gas, or other material which is injected into a well to facilitate
[the] production of oil or gas, or water derived in association with
oil or gas production and disposed of in a well, if the well . . . is
128
approved by authority of the State in which the well is located.

Given that Congress had expressly defined these two categories, “[i]t
could have [also] extended the exceptions to include pollutants from
129
one navigable water to another. It did not.”
After Gorsuch and Consumers Power, the issue of water transfer and
the exemption of dam pollution from NPDES permitting
requirements remained unchallenged until courts began to deny
deference to the EPA’s policies and distinguish the facts in Gorsuch
and Consumers Power. In Dubois v. United States Department of
130
Agriculture,
the First Circuit held that an NPDES permit was
131
necessary for an interbasin water transfer. In order to make snow, a
ski resort operator moved water from the East Branch of the polluted
Pemigewasset River into a relatively undefiled pond, called Loon

126

Id. § 1313(d)(1)(C)–(D). See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1139 (9th
Cir. 2002) (holding that the CWA clearly requires TMDLs to be set for waters not
meeting water quality standards due to both point and nonpoint sources, and that
nothing in the statute indicates that TMDLs were not required for waters impaired
only by nonpoint sources).
127
Brief of the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 12, Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95 (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22766718.
128
33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2000).
129
Brief for the Respondent Friends of the Everglades at 26, Miccosukee, 541 U.S.
95 (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22733911.
130
102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996).
131
Id. at 1299.
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Pond, that was at an elevation upstream from the East Branch.
Water from Loon Pond naturally flowed into the East Branch, but
133
water from the East Branch did not naturally flow into Loon Pond.
Loon Pond ranked in the upper ninety-fifth percentile of all lakes
and ponds in northern New England for low levels of phosphorous
and therefore had limited plant growth, high water clarity, and high
134
total biological production. The pond not only supported a variety
of life in its ecosystem, but it also was a major source of drinking
135
In contrast, “intake water taken
water for the town just below it.
from the East Branch contain[ed] bacteria, other aquatic organisms
136
such as Giardia lambia, phosphorous, turbidity and heat.”
Oil and
137
grease were also allegedly present in the discharge water.
A citizen suit, brought against the Forest Service, claimed that
the Forest Service violated the CWA “by failing to obtain an NPDES
permit before approving [the] plan to remove water from the East
Branch, use it to pressurize and prevent freezing in its snowmaking
138
equipment, and then discharge the used water into Loon Pond.”
The district court ruled there was no “addition” of pollutants to Loon
Pond because the intake water from the East Branch and the water
from Loon Pond were all part of a “singular entity,” the “waters of the
139
United States,” and must not therefore be considered individually.
As long as the pipes added no new pollutants, the district court
concluded that the transfer of water from the East Branch into Loon
140
Pond did not necessitate an NPDES permit.
The First Circuit reversed, holding that that the East Branch of
the Pemigewasset River and Loon Pond were two wholly distinct
bodies of water and that the transfer of polluted water from the
Pemigewasset River into Loon Pond was an “addition” under the
141
CWA, which required an NPDES permit.
The First Circuit held
that the “singular entity” argument had no basis in law and that
under such an interpretation of “addition,” the pollution of one
navigable water would necessitate all other navigable waters to
passively suffer the same fate:
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

Id. at 1277–78.
Id. at 1297.
Id. at 1277.
Id.
Dubois, 102 F.3d at 1278.
Id.
Id. at 1296.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1299.
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We can take judicial notice that the Pemigewasset River was for
years one of the most polluted rivers in New England, the
repository for raw sewage from factories and towns. It emitted an
overwhelming odor and was known to peel the paint off buildings
located on its banks. Yet, under the district court’s theory, even if
such conditions still prevailed, a proposal to withdraw water from
the Pemigewasset to discharge it into Loon Pond would be
analogous to moving water from the top to the bottom of a single
pond; it would not constitute an “addition” of pollutants “from an
external source” because both the East Branch and Loon Pond
are part of the “singular” waters of the United States. The district
court apparently would reach the same conclusion regardless of
how polluted the Pemigewasset was or how pristine Loon Pond
was. We do not believe Congress intended such an irrational
142
result.

Additionally, the court found that the transferred water ceased to be
a water of the United States when it became subject to private control
143
rather than natural processes.
The Dubois court stated it was
“simply wrong” to analogize the situation to a “dam that merely
accumulates the same water” as in Gorsuch, or a “pump storage facility
that stores water from one source in a different place” as in Consumers
144
Power. Distinguishing the dam cases as involving “one flowing water
body into another stationary, colder body,” the court concluded it
simply could not allow “such a watering down of Congress’ clear
145
statutory protections.”
Five years later the issue surfaced again when the Second Circuit
decided Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New
146
York. The court held that New York City needed an NPDES permit
for diverting water from one drainage basin into another in order to
147
facilitate its supply of drinking water to the city’s population.
The
142

Dubois, 102 F.3d at 1297.
Id.
144
Id. at 1299 (italics in original). The First Circuit conceded that internal
pumping would not cause an “addition” of pollutants to the pond because that would
be considered a redistribution of pollutants from one part of the pond to the other.
Id. at 1296–97. Internal pumping involves “no barrier separating the water at the top
of a pond from the water at the bottom of the same pond; chemicals, organisms, and
even heat are able to pass from the top to the bottom or vice versa, at rates
determined only by laws of science.” Id. at 1297. The court concluded that the
transfer of water from the East Branch to Loon Pond, however, would not occur
naturally, stating that “the East Branch and Loon Pond are not the same body of
water; the East Branch is indeed a source ‘external’ to Loon Pond.” Id.
145
Dubois, 102 F.3d at 1299.
146
273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001).
147
Id. at 493.
143
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transfer involved moving water from the Schoharie Reservoir through
the Shandaken Tunnel and into the Esopus Creek, a Hudson River
148
The City of New York had operated this transfer system
tributary.
149
since before World War II.
Absent the tunnel and under natural
conditions, water from the Schoharie Reservoir would never reach
the Esopus Creek; instead, the water leaving the Reservoir would
“flow north in Schoharie Creek, join the Mohawk River, and flow into
150
the Hudson River.”
A group of environmental organizations alleged that the
Shandaken Tunnel discharged “pollutants in the form of ‘suspended
solids,’ ‘turbidity,’ and heat into the Esopus Creek,” thereby violating
151
the state water quality standards and requiring an NPDES permit.
While the EPA maintained that dam-produced pollution is exempt
from permit requirements, the Second Circuit refused to grant broad
deference to the EPA’s position, explaining that “‘interpretations
contained in formats such as opinion letters are “entitled to respect”
. . . but only to the extent that those interpretations have the “power
152
The court did not find the EPA’s position
to persuade.”’”
persuasive at all and was able to distinguish the facts from those in
Gorsuch and Consumers Power. While Gorsuch and Consumers Power
involved the “recirculation of water, without anything added ‘from
the outside world,’” the Second Circuit was faced with a situation
where water was artificially diverted from its natural course in order
153
to travel many miles through a tunnel and into the Esopus Creek.
Because these two water bodies were “utterly unrelated,” the court
held that “[n]o one [could] reasonably argue that the water in the
Reservoir and the Esopus [were] in any sense the ‘same,’ such that
154
‘addition’ of one to the other [was] a logical impossibility.”
148

Id. at 484.
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 485. “Esopus Creek, Catskill contended, is naturally clearer and cooler
than the water entering it from the Tunnel and supports ‘one of the premier trout
fishing streams in the Catskill Region.’” Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 485.
152
Id. at 491 (quoting Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000))
(ellipses in original).
153
Id.
154
Id. at 492. The Catskill Mountains court also rejected the “singular entity”
theory raised in Dubois:
Such a theory would mean that movement of water from one discrete
water body to another would not be an addition even if it involved a
transfer of water from a water body contaminated with myriad
pollutants to a pristine water body containing few or no pollutants.
Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the
word “addition.”
149
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The Ninth Circuit encountered similar issues and held in
Northern Plains Resource Council v. Fidelity Exploration and Development
155
Co.
that Montana could not exempt Fidelity Exploration &
Development Company (“Fidelity”) from its obligation to obtain an
NPDES permit for its coal bed methane (“CBM”) extraction
156
During the extraction process, groundwater was pumped
process.
to the surface and into various holding ponds, including the Tongue
157
River which was used for irrigation by farmers downstream.
Though the extraction process did not actually add pollutants to the
groundwater, the water naturally contained calcium, magnesium,
sodium, chloride, fluoride, and many other substances that could
affect the downstream farms, “caus[ing] soil particles to unbind and
disperse, destroying soil structure and reducing or eliminating the
158
ability of the soil to drain water.” Since the CBM waters came from
deep underground aquifers, it would never reach the Tongue River,
159
but for Fidelity’s extraction process. The Ninth Circuit rejected the
argument that such discharge water could not be a pollutant simply
because it was “unaltered and transported from one body of water to
160
Instead, the court concluded that its situation was
another.”
“practically indistinguishable” from Catskill Mountains and Dubois,
even if the pollutants were not added by man, but were naturally
161
present.
A comparable holding was made by the Ninth Circuit in Borden
162
Ranch Partnership v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, although
the permit required was a Section 404 permit from the Army Corps of
Engineers for “dredged or fill material” instead of a Section 402
163
At issue was a form of agricultural activity called
NPDES permit.
“deep ripping” in which long metal prongs were dragged through soil
behind a tractor or a bulldozer and a “ripper” gouged through a
restrictive layer of soil, disgorging the soil and then dragging it
Id. at 493.
155
325 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2003).
156
Id. at 1165.
157
Id. at 1158.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 1163.
161
Fidelity, 325 F.3d at 1163.
162
261 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2001).
163
Id. at 818. While a Section 402 permit concerns the discharge of a “pollutant”
from a “point source” into the Nation’s waters, a Section 404 permit grants the Army
Corps of Engineers the authority to issue permits for discharges of dredged or fill
material.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A) (2000).
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164

behind the ripper.
The defendant argued that deep ripping was
not an “addition” of a “pollutant” into wetlands “because it simply
churns up soil that is already there, placing it back basically where it
165
Nevertheless, the court held that a “pollutant” had
came from.”
certainly been “added” even if it did not involve the introduction of
166
The court reasoned,
material brought in from somewhere else.
“[p]rior to deep ripping, the protective layer of soil was intact,
holding the wetland in place. Afterwards, that soil was wrenched up,
167
Therefore, a
moved around, and redeposited somewhere else.”
Section 404 permit was required in order for the defendant to
168
continue his practice of deep ripping.
An inference can be made from the previous cases that, under
certain circumstances, the mere transport of unaltered water from
the diverting water body to the receiving water body may require an
169
NPDES permit.
Such a circumstance would occur if the unaltered
water is diverted into a receiving water body where it would not
naturally flow and the diverted water degrades the receiving water
body. Therefore, a “unitary waters” theory would not survive should
courts choose to myopically focus on the natural flow of waters rather
than the fact that they are all somehow connected to one another in
170
order to determine whether they are “meaningfully distinct.”
164

Borden Ranch, 261 F.3d at 812.
Id. at 814.
166
Id. at 815.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 818. The Ninth Circuit based its holding on cases it thought
“recognize[d] that activities that destroy the ecology of a wetland are not immune
from the [CWA] merely because they do not involve the introduction of material
brought in from somewhere else.” Id. at 814–15. For instance, the Ninth Circuit
“considered a claim that placer mining activities were exempt” from the CWA, and
held that “removing material from a stream bed, sifting out the gold, and returning
the material to the stream bed was an ‘addition’ of a pollutant.” Borden Ranch, 261
F.3d at 814 (citing Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 1990)). Also, the
Borden Ranch court aligned its reasoning with that of the Fourth Circuit in United
States v. Deaton, where the court held:
It is of no consequence that what is now dredged spoil was previously
present on the same property in the less threatening form of dirt and
vegetation in an undisturbed state. What is important is that once that
material was excavated from the wetland, its redeposit in that same
wetland added a pollutant where none had been before.
Id. (quoting United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 335–336 (4th Cir. 2000)).
169
See Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. City of New York, 273
F.3d 481, 492 (2d Cir. 2001); N. Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity Exploration and Dev.
Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003).
170
See Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 96. Still open for debate, however, is whether an
NPDES permit is required despite section 511(a)(2) of the CWA “which states that
the CWA ‘shall not be construed’ as ‘affecting or impairing the authority of the
165
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IV. THE INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCES OF REGULATING THE
MOVEMENT OF UNALTERED WATER UNDER THE CWA
If courts decline to accept the “unitary waters” theory, an NPDES
permit may be required for every engineered diversion of one
navigable water into another, and thousands of new permits might
have to be issued, particularly in the western states where engineered
171
As the South
transfers are relied upon by water supply networks.
Florida Water Management District argued:
A host of state and local water management agencies and their
national organizations, numerous States, and state and municipal
government organizations . . . have explained that imposition on
NPDES permitting on hundreds of thousands of such [water]
transfers would be impractical, wasteful, hugely disruptive of the
Nation’s intricate system of water allocation and control, and
entirely otiose in light of nonpoint source programs and powers
172
that address pollution in diverted waters.

Among those affected by the new permitting requirements will be
agricultural irrigation districts, suppliers of drinking water, mineral
extraction operations, electric power producers, and residential
173
developers.
Water management agencies will be exposed to huge
Secretary of the Army (A) to maintain navigation or (B) under the Act of March 3,
1899’” which, according to section 511, is the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. Paul
F. Foley, Missing the Point with Point-Source “Addition” Semantics: Section 511 of the Clean
Water Act Exempts Interconnected Waterways from Section 402 Jurisdiction, Period?, 9 OCEAN
& COASTAL L.J. 65, 78–79 (2003). Though not mentioned in Miccosukee, this
argument notes that the CWA cannot “affect or impair” the Secretary of the Army’s
navigation authority or authority under the Rivers and Harbors Act:
Pursuant to the Secretary of the Army’s authority, the Army Corps
issues permits for activities affecting navigable waters. Section 10 of
the Rivers and Harbors Act prohibits altering or modifying, “in any
manner,” the “course, location, condition, or capacity of” any navigable
water, including canals or “the channel of any navigable water,”
without the Secretary of the Army’s authorization. This language is
extremely broad: requiring a Section 402 permit for a canal pump
station . . . and the prospect of the canal’s continued operation being
cast in doubt—is, on its face, a change in the “condition, or capacity
of” that canal in some “manner.” Any such change in the condition or
capacity of a waterbody must be approved by the Army Corps under
Section 10—not by EPA under Section 402 of the CWA.
Id. at 78–79 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000)).
171
Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico in Support of
Petitioner at 2–4, Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95 (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22137032.
172
Reply Brief at 13, Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95 (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 23051957.
173
See Davis & Doster, supra note 15, at 91–92. Suppliers of drinking water move
water from basins in which water is plentiful to basins in which need exceeds supply;
mineral extraction operations often redirect waters over large land area; electric
power producers fear they will need permits to discharge cooling water in separate
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penalties for violations, and even criminal prosecution.
Also, the
EPA will suffer many administrative burdens as it seeks to develop
technology-based effluent limitations for the new class of dischargers
175
and confronts an already backlogged NPDES program.
One of the most troublesome effects of new NPDES permitting
requirements will be the disruption to the agricultural economy if the
newly-permitted irrigation districts seek to pass the high costs of
176
These
treatment back upstream to their agricultural clients.
increased costs could thwart the competitiveness of United States
agricultural commodities in global markets and force alterations in
numerous aspects of farming operations such as crop selection,
177
tillage practices, and pesticide use.
If farmers are given an
incentive to move away from certain practices and products, pesticide
manufacturers will also suffer by encountering changes in demand
for particular crop protection products that would otherwise have to
178
The increased agricultural
be removed from downstream waters.
costs could also mean relocating agricultural production to areas that
179
have relatively lower costs. Though this may strike a balance for the
benefit of consumers, it may also continue to harm the environment
if these lower costs are achieved by ignoring harmful environmental
externalities. This availability to simply relocate production, however,
may be somewhat unrealistic:

waters from which the water was withdrawn; and residential developers may be
limited by the amount of water available to expand communities, particularly those
in warm and dry climates. Id. at 97.
174
See supra note 72 and accompanying text. Even a negligent violation can bring
significant fines and two years in prison. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (2000). In Catskill
Mountains, the district court issued a hefty $5.7 million penalty against the City of
New York. See Catskill Mountains, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 57.
175
See Reply Brief, supra note 172, at 15 (citing EPA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL,
EPA SHOULD TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO ADDRESS FUNDING SHORTFALLS AND TIME
SLIPPAGES IN PERMIT COMPLIANCE SYSTEM MODERNIZATION EFFORT, No. 2003-M-00014
(May 20, 2003)). It has been suggested that the NPDES program is an overly
burdensome requirement simply because it lacks the flexibility to deal appropriately
with transfers of untreated water. Brief of Amici Curiae the City of New York et al.,
supra note 121, at 13–14. “Where the transferred water contains pollutants that are
not introduced by the entity operating the transfer, as in Miccosukee (where the water
contains phosphorous from urban runoff) and Catskill Mountains (where the water
contains naturally occurring turbidity), this requirement can place an impossible
burden on the transferor.” Id.
176
See Brief for Amici Curiae Florida Fruit and Vegetable Ass’n et al. in Support of
Petitioner at 4, Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95 (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22118364.
177
See Davis & Doster, supra note 15, at 97.
178
Id.
179
Id.
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Manufacturers and traders may relocate when times are tough,
but the farmer’s reliance on land (an asset that cannot be moved
from place to place) creates a somewhat permanent interest in
the stability and security of the state. A given plot of land is
irrevocably tied to the territorial state in which it happens to be
located. This gives farmers an interest in the politics and defense
of the state, as it limits their ability to relocate their assets when
180
political winds change.

The unexpected burden of permitting requirements may also
181
increase costs and time delays that could force operations to cease.
After the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Miccosukee, several agricultural
groups feared the costs and expenses associated with the ruling:
If the Eleventh Circuit’s decision stands, the South Florida Water
Management District (“SFWMD”) will have to increase its budget
to pay for the expensive NPDES permitting process for S-9, the
pump station that moves water from one side of a levee to the
other in the same watershed. SFWMD will more than likely
obtain the funding to obtain and implement this NPDES permit
by increasing agriculture privilege taxes, ad valorem taxes on
property owners in the district, fees, and assessments. The costs
may be further magnified by the SFWMD having to take steps to
permit many other structures or facilities similarly situated to the
182
S-9 facility.

Despite these agricultural groups’ outcries, it may be time for
the community to accept responsibility and share the costs of their
harms, as agricultural nutrient, pesticide, and sediment pollution
remain as the leading source of impairment to the nation’s lakes,
183
rivers, and estuaries.
While added regulatory burdens will
180

Paul B. Thompson, Globalization, Losers and Property Rights, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 602, 608 (2000).
181
Davis & Doster, supra note 15, at 96.
In perhaps the majority of cases, local water management agencies will
be unable to obtain or comply with NPDES permits for facilities that
are essential to many public uses, including flood control, ensuring a
reliable supply of water for domestic, commercial, and industrial uses,
and fire suppression. Where it is possible to comply with permit terms
and conditions, the cost of doing so is incalculable. The harm to the
public will be enormous and direct if the Eleventh Circuit decision is
upheld, while in most cases the decision will not lead to any
measurable environmental benefit.
Brief of Amici Curiae the City of New York et al., supra note 121, at 5.
182
Brief for Florida Fruit and Vegetable Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note
176,
at 4 (citations omitted).
183
J.B. Ruhl, Three Questions for Agriculture About the Environment, 17 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 395, 400 (2002).
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effectively force farms out of business, this was true of many other
industries that were forced to operate under the “polluter pays” ethic
184
The challenge is “whether we have
of environmental regulation.
the political will to cause the farming industry some pain, but the
185
ingenuity to do so with some sense of efficiency.”
Courts still recognize the catastrophic consequences of forcing
certain facilities to cease operations, and have often issued flexible
186
rulings so as to accommodate the water management districts.
For
instance, in Miccosukee the Eleventh Circuit chose not to issue an
injunction to stop operation of the S-9 pump station because it would
have resulted in massive flooding in the urban, agricultural, and
187
residential area.
Similarly, the district court in Catskill Mountains
declined to enjoin the City of New York from operating the
Shandaken Tunnel without a permit because it would have led to

184

Id. at 406. While other industries had to take costly measures to comply with
environmental regulations and have adopted successful arrangements of
environmental efficiency and production efficiency, the agricultural industry “has
been stunted by widespread industry advocacy and government endorsement of the
‘first stewards of the land’ rhetoric” which claims that because farmers “depend” on
their land, they are “environmentally benign or, even better, a positive
environmental force.” Id. at 401–03. Yet, the fishing industry is just as dependent on
fisheries, but has nonetheless depleted the fisheries to unsustainable levels. Id. With
regards to the “stewardship” argument of agricultural policy:
[H]ow are we to count depositing fertilizers, pesticides, and animal
wastes on the land, exposing soils to wind and water erosion, sucking
water out of rivers and aquifers, and all the other traits of modern
farming? And regardless of how well they care for their land, the
bottom line is that farming has significant adverse offsite impacts, as
runoff and wind carry pollution, wastes, and sediments to distant lands
and waters. This is stewardship of the land?
Id. at 401–02.
185
Id. at 406.
Regulation at an appropriate level will be difficult to achieve in light of
the political power of the agricultural lobby, the daunting technical
and administrative difficulties of regulating such a decentralized
industry, and the costs of implementing such regulations. Yet, progress
may be possible through free-market pricing, environmental subsidies,
and taxes on agricultural inputs designed to reflect their
environmental cost. The issue is not different from many problems in
environmental economics in that either appropriate pricing or
equivalent regulation can lead to significantly improved, if not optimal,
behavior.
David E. Adelman & John H. Barton, Environmental Regulation for Agriculture: Towards
a Framework to Promote Sustainable Intensive Agriculture, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 22
(2002).
186
See Miccosukee, 280 F.3d at 1369–71; Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout
Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 244 F. Supp. 2d 41, 54–55 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
187
See Miccosukee, 280 F.3d at 1369–71.
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water supply shortages for millions of people.
This raises a
question regarding the realistic ability to enforce the NPDES
program where high permit costs could disturb the livelihood of so
many people.
The imposition of permitting requirements on the diversion and
delivery of water in an unaltered condition from one basin to another
basin will most considerably impact the economic and social well189
According to a brief filed by the states
being of the western states.
th
of Colorado and New Mexico, “[w]est of the 100 Meridian, the
nation is generally arid; that is, it receives less than the thirty
inches of annual precipitation necessary to sustain non-irrigated
agriculture. . . . Hence, it is necessary to divert and deliver water
through a complex system of manmade and natural conveyances and
190
In the absence of such a system, agricultural regions
reservoirs.”
would not be able to support crops and many popular cities would
never have flourished, including Denver, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, and
191
Phoenix.
In Miccosukee, the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to allay the fear
of high regulatory costs by suggesting that states or the EPA issue
general permits to point sources associated with water distribution
192
Also, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
programs.
Protection claimed that assertions stating that the NPDES permitting
program was a “costly, time-consuming, burdensome and
bureaucratic program that [would] ‘wreak havoc’” were simply
188

See Catskill Mountains, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 54–55.
Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico, supra note 171,
at 5; see also Brief Amici Curiae of the Nat’l Water Res. Ass’n et al. in Support of
Petitioner at 10, Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95 (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22137029.
190
Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico, supra note 171,
at 2. “If water is the ‘lifeblood’ of the West, then transbasin diversions/deliveries are
surely the ‘arteries’ that sustain the region’s cities, towns, agriculture and industry.”
Id. at 29.
191
Id. at 2.
192
See Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 108. But see Peter D. Nichols, Miccosukee: The
Potential for Clean Water Act Discharge Permits for Water Transfers, 33 COLO. LAW. 119, 121
(2004).
If it ultimately is determined that engineered transfers are required to
obtain NPDES permits, they will be subject to all attendant CWA
requirements, including water quality standards, anti-degradation, and
wasteload allocations for impaired waters.
These far-reaching
requirements would accrue under any kind of permit, whether
individual, general, or nationwide. Many water rights owners would
have no alternative to curtailing their water transfers to meet NPDES
permitting conditions, wasteload allocations for impaired waters, and
anti-degradation requirements of the CWA.
Id.
189
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“unsupported,” “not accurate,” and “highly speculative.”
The
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court interpreted the CWA to cover
interbasin water transfers in 1986 and since then has not
194
Therefore, the
encountered any catastrophic consequences.
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection professed that
“Pennsylvania’s actual experience with its NPDES program . . .
establishes that the NPDES program provides a flexible, efficient and
195
effective means to protect water quality and stream uses.”
V. “WATERING DOWN” THE CWA’S AGRICULTURAL
EXEMPTION AND SOVEREIGN POWERS OF THE STATES
A. The Agricultural Exemption
Even if it is agreed that the agricultural industry should share in
the costs of its environmental harms, the fact of the matter is that the
CWA expressly provides agricultural exemptions for the discharge of
196
The NPDES program
waters used for the production of crops.
expressly prohibits any permit requirements for agricultural
discharges, stating that “[t]he Administrator shall not require a
permit under this section for discharges composed entirely of return
flows from irrigated agriculture, nor shall the Administrator directly
197
or indirectly require any State to require such a permit.”
The
possibility of federally regulating the movement of unaltered water
under the NPDES program could effectively undermine these
agricultural exemptions through “increased taxes, fees and/or
assessments imposed by [water management districts] to pay for
198
NPDES permits and technologies for . . . [certain] facilities.”
Originally, the NPDES program did not cover non-point sources,
which were primarily agricultural; instead, these sources were

193

Brief of Amici Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. in
Support of Respondents at 16, Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95 (No. 02-626), 2003 WL
22793537.
194
Id. at 11–18 (citing Del-AWARE Unlimited v. Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 508 A.2d 348
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986)).
195
Id. at 16. The CWA provides for “schedules of compliance” to allow long-term
implementation of corrective measures necessary to achieve compliance with
applicable water quality standards, while allowing important, though problematic
water diversions to continue in the short-term. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(17) (2000).
196
33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(1), 1362(14) (2000).
197
Id. § 1341(a)(1).
198
Brief for Amici Curiae Florida Fruit and Vegetable Ass’n et al., supra note 176,
at 5.
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199

addressed by the states.
As Senator Bob Dole reasoned, this would
“place responsibility on the states for instituting and expanding the
200
In the CWA’s
control of water pollution related to agriculture.”
1977 amendments, the exemption for “return flows from irrigated
agriculture” was expressly added as an exclusion from the definition
201
A provision prohibiting NPDES permits for
of “point source.”
202
agricultural discharges was also added.
The Water Quality Act of
1987 exempted “agricultural stormwater discharges” from the
definition of “point source,” confirming Congress’ intent that
203
agriculture is not covered as industrial or municipal pollution.
If the diversion of unaltered water requires an NPDES permit
because agricultural discharges have contributed to the “addition” of
“pollutants” to the navigable waters, the regulatory costs of complying
204
with the permit may be passed on to farmers and ranchers.
Consequently, the deliberate economic benefits realized from the
agricultural exemptions may be substantially eroded, frustrating
Congress’ primary intentions for the exemptions. The Eleventh
Circuit acknowledged this in Fishermen Against the Destruction of the
205
Environment, Inc. v. Closter Farms, Inc., where the court interpreted
206
and applied the agricultural exemptions from the NPDES program.
Closter Farms irrigated sugar cane by a process called flood
207
irrigation.
Water from Lake Okeechobee was forced from
irrigation canals “into the sugarcane fields by raising the water levels
208
in the canals” and was then discharged back into the lake.
Stormwater was also pumped into the lake, rather than allowing it to
209
follow its natural flow. The Eleventh Circuit held the discharges to
199

Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 208; 86 Stat. 816, 839–41 (1972) (codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. § 1288 (2000)); S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 1 (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3669.
200
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3759 (supplemental views of Sen. Dole).
201
Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 33(b); 91 Stat. 1577 (1977) (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000)). This exclusion overrode a 1975 federal district court
opinion holding the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
did not exclude point sources from agriculture from NPDES permitting. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 396 F. Supp. 1393, 1402 (D.D.C. 1975).
202
Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 33(c); 91 Stat. 1577 (1977) (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. § 1342(1) (2000)).
203
Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 503; 101 Stat. 7, 75 (1987) (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. § 1462(14) (2000)).
204
See Davis & Doster, supra note 15, at 97.
205
300 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002).
206
Id. at 1297.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Id.
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the lake were covered by the agricultural exemptions and, with
regards to the stormwater runoff, that “[n]othing in the language of
the statute indicates that stormwater can only be discharged where it
210
The court further held that the canals used
naturally would flow.”
to irrigate the sugarcane fields through flood irrigation were a
“return flow from irrigation agriculture” and expressly exempt from
211
the definition of “point sources” regulated by the NPDES program.
Most of the cases involving the movement of unaltered water to
another navigable water body, such as in Miccosukee, also involve
212
pollution caused by agricultural runoff.
If water diversion facilities
are now forced to obtain NPDES permits because of this type of
pollution, it is likely that costs associated with such regulation will be
passed on or at least shared with agricultural communities; an effect
which possibly undermines the very purpose of having an agricultural
213
exemption under the CWA.
B. Federalism
“Federalism” concerns the balance of power between “a
centralized but limited federal government and dispersed but
214
relatively unfettered state governments.” It advances the protection
of individual liberty by “preventing governmental power from
215
concentrating in one governmental body or in a single person.” In
enacting the CWA, Congress showed concern in maintaining states’
traditional rights and responsibilities “to plan the development and
use of land and water resources” so as not to impair allocations by
216
states of their waters. Therefore, extending the NPDES program to
210

Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000)).
Closter Farms, 300 F.3d at 1297.
212
Ruhl, supra note 183, at 400. As of 1992, farm runoff released 1.16 million tons
of phosphorous and 4.65 million tons of nitrogen into the nation’s waters each year.
Id.
213
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2000).
214
Craig, supra note 32, at 119–20.
215
Id. at 120.
216
33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000). The CWA also states:
Except as expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter
shall (1) preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision
thereof or interstate agency to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or
limitation respecting discharges of pollutants, or (B) any requirement
respecting control or abatement of pollution; except that if an effluent
limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition,
pretreatment standard, or standard of performance is in effect under
this chapter, such State or political subdivision or interstate agency may
not adopt or enforce any effluent limitation, or other limitation,
effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of
211

WELSH FINAL.DOC

2005]

10/12/2005 6:51:05 PM

COMMENT

321

the traditionally local water management activity of moving water
across levees may fundamentally shift the federal-state balance
217
achieved in the CWA.
The CWA states that “[i]t is the policy of Congress that the
authority of each State to allocate quantities of water within its
jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired
218
by the [CWA].” As a result, Congress chose to “recognize, preserve,
and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to
prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the
development and use (including restoration, preservation, and
219
Consequently, the
enhancement) of land and water resources.”
Supreme Court has acknowledged that the CWA must be interpreted
with Congress’ intent to maintain the federal-state balance of powers
220
in mind. In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
221
Army Corps of Engineers (“SWANCC”), the United States Supreme
Court noted that land and water use decisions are traditionally and
primarily state prerogatives and where a statutory interpretation
“alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal
encroachment upon a traditional state power,” Congress must clearly
222
convey its intent.
Congress has never expressly established its intent to impose
NPDES permit requirements on transbasin diversions, though it has
clearly expressed its intent to honor long-standing federal deference
223
In 1977, the Senate adopted the Wallop-Hart
to state water law.
Amendment in reaction to proposals that “reducing water
diversions/deliveries under state law might be necessary to solve
water quality problems” and in order to ensure the protection of the

performance which is less stringent than the effluent limitation, or
other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment
standard, or standard of performance under this chapter; or (2) be
construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or
jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including
boundary waters) of such States.
Id. § 1370.
217
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 74, at 4.
218
33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000).
219
Id. § 1251(b).
220
See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S.
159, 163 (2001) [hereinafter, “SWANCC”]. See also PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep’t of
Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 704 (1994).
221
531 U.S. 159 (2001).
222
Id. at 173.
223
See Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico, supra note
171, at 5–9.

WELSH FINAL.DOC

322

10/12/2005 6:51:05 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:289

224

states’ sovereign powers.
As part of the 1977 CWA amendments
and building upon the 1972 amendments, Congress declared that the
authority of each state to allocate quantities of water will not be
impaired by the CWA and that nothing in the CWA will be construed
225
to abrogate water rights established by any state. Therefore, it may
be that NPDES permit requirements for the movement of unaltered
water “under individual water rights allocated under state law would
directly abrogate state water allocations” and that “[s]uch federal
interference has important implications, not only for individual water
rights, but also for comity among the states under interstate compacts
and equitable apportionments and for the maximum utilization of
226
scarce water resources.”
VI. MAKING WAY THROUGH MURKY WATERS
Based on the Supreme Court’s guidance in Miccosukee and
supportive case law, it seems that the mere transport of unaltered
water from one body of water to a water body that would not naturally
receive this diverted water could require an NPDES permit if the
227
diverted water degrades the receiving water body.
Permitting the
diversion of such unaltered water could affect thousands of dams,
levees, aqueducts, canals, and other structures used for ordinary
water management, public water supply, flood control, and
228
While it could be argued that the NPDES program is
navigation.
the wrong tool for regulating water transfers and diversions, there
remains a concern that allowing the unpermitted diversion of
polluted water would open the door to major degradation of less
polluted water bodies by more polluted ones, thereby creating a
significant gap in the states’ authority under the CWA to protect and
229
maintain the quality of their waters.
224

Id. at 10.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000).
226
Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico, supra note 171,
at 12. Western states are particularly concerned with how the CWA’s federal-state
relationships affect the allocation of water: “[t]he history of the relationship
between the Federal Government and the States in the reclamation of the arid lands
of the Western States is both long and involved, but through it runs the consistent
thread of purposeful and continued deference to state water law by Congress.”
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978).
227
Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 112; Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited v.
City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 492 (2d Cir. 2001); N. Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity
Exploration and Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003).
228
See Davis & Doster, supra note 15, at 92.
229
See Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico, supra note
171, at 12.
225
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The ultimate holding in Miccosukee on remand has the potential
230
to overturn dam cases such as Gorsuch and Consumers Power.
Both
the C-11 basin and WCA-3 were part of the historical Everglades and
have been described as waters that would essentially be a single water
231
To say that two bodies of water
body, but for man’s intervention.
would be one, but for man’s intervention, would describe a dam and,
under the established law, dams do not “add” pollutants to
downstream waters.
Therefore, if the South Florida Water
Management District is required to obtain an NPDES permit, despite
the possibility that the C-11 basin and WCA-3 would together
naturally be a single wetland, this would presumably contradict the
holdings of the dam cases. If the C-11 basin and WCA-3 are in fact
found not to naturally constitute a single water body, the only
alternative argument is the “unitary waters” theory. Unfortunately,
given the plain language, structure, history, and interpretations of the
CWA, it is likely that the “unitary waters” argument will, in fact, not
hold water.
As more and more water diversion facilities are becoming
exposed to stricter water regulations, each of their cases will come
down to detailed and complex issues such as where the water would
flow, but for the intervening facility, and the particular processes
used to divert the water. These potentially confusing and factintensive inquiries have led facility operators and water districts to
argue possible inconsistencies with the CWA’s agricultural
exemption, the undermining of federalism, and administrative
232
burdens. What these groups may ideally be seeking, however, is a
separate exemption for their facilities under the CWA. As Justice
Scalia suggested: “The horribles that can be imagined–if they are
really so horrible and ever come to pass–can readily be corrected by
Congress” should the NPDES permit process as enacted truly prove
233
unworkable in practice.
Unfortunately, this is unrealistic, as the
difficulty and reluctance to propose an amendment for the CWA will
always serve as an obstacle.

230

Brief of the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 127, at 8 n.2.
“If the dam context is determined to be factually indistinguishable from the facts of
this case, however, it would become apparent that the dam cases were wrongly
decided.” Id.
231
Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 101.
232
Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico, supra note 171,
at 2.
233
E. Assoc. Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 69 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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It is also questionable whether the EPA could itself exempt its
own categories of point sources from the CWA’s permit
requirements. The D.C. Circuit held in Natural Resources Defense
234
Council, Inc. v. Costle that:
The wording of the statute, legislative history, and
precedents are clear: the EPA Administrator does not have
authority to exempt categories of point sources from the
permit requirements of [Section] 402. Courts may not
manufacture for an agency a revisory power inconsistent
235
with the clear intent of the relevant statute.
The court noted that such a task was appropriate only for the
legislature, rather than the judiciary, “where the public interest may
be considered from the multifaceted points of view of the
236
representational process.”
More recently, the Ninth Circuit
distinguished the EPA’s authority to define point and non-point
sources from attempts to wholly exempt categories of point sources
237
from NPDES permitting requirements.
In League of Wilderness
238
Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren, the court
stated that although the EPA has the power to define point and nonpoint source pollution “where there is room for reasonable
interpretation of the statutory definition,” the EPA may not merely
“exempt from NPDES permit requirements that which clearly meets
the statutory definition of a point source by ‘defining’ it as a nonpoint source. Allowing the EPA to contravene the intent of Congress,
by simply substituting the word ‘define’ for the word ‘exempt,’ would
239
turn Costle on its head.”
What the Costle court did concede was the necessary flexibility in
the conditioning of permits, so long as the conditions were not
240
inconsistent with the express terms of the CWA.
Since the EPA
could not exempt categories of point sources, the court suggested the
use of general permits as devices to mitigate the overwhelming
burden of issuing thousands of new permits, while accommodating

234

NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Id.
236
Id. (citing Fed. Power Comm’n v. Texaco, Inc. 417 U.S. 380, 400 (1974)).
237
League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v.
Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th Cir. 2002).
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Costle, 568 F.2d at 1382.
235
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“Congress’ clear mandate that all point sources have permits.” This
suggestion may now serve as one answer to the troubles associated
with imposing NPDES permitting requirements upon water diversion
facilities.
While an applicant for an individual NPDES permit must
provide information about, among other things, the point source
itself, the nature of the pollutants to be discharged, and any water
treatment system that will be used, general permits greatly reduce
these administrative burdens by authorizing discharges from a
242
category of point sources within a specified geographic area.
Once
the EPA or a state agency issues such a permit, covered entities, in
some cases, need take no further action to achieve compliance with
243
the NPDES besides adhering to the permit conditions.
The EPA often uses such general permits for the oil and gas
244
industry. Also, the United States Army Corps of Engineers’ dredge
and fill permitting program includes a “nationwide permit” which
authorizes the discharge of dredged or fill material for small-scale
245
projects that will have minimal harmful effects on the environment.
The State of Pennsylvania has advocated its use of general permits as
a way to significantly save on both time and money for applicants,
while still meeting the applicable provisions of the CWA and state
246
Pennsylvania uses general permits for categories such as
laws.
concentrated animal feeding operations, stormwater associated
247
construction activities, and municipal separate storm sewer systems.
These general permits are said to have eliminated a “litany of

241

Id. at 1381. The court noted the practical differences between general permits
and exemptions:
An exemption tends to become indefinite: the problem drops out of
sight, into a pool of inertia, unlikely to be recalled in the absence of
crisis or a strong political protagonist. In contrast, the general or area
permit approach forces the Agency to focus on the problems of specific
regions and requires that the problems of the region be reconsidered
at least every five years, the maximum duration of a permit.
Id. at 1382.
242
See 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(b)(2)(v) (2003).
243
Id.
244
See Texas Oil & Gas Ass’n. v. EPA, 161 F.3d 923, 929 (5th Cir. 1998).
245
Keith Rizzardi, Regulating Watershed Restoration: Why the Perfect Permit is the Enemy
of the Good Project, 27 NOVA. L. REV. 51, 71 (2002).
246
Kathleen A. McGinty, Pennsylvania’s Approach to Sustainable Development, 19 NAT.
RES. & ENV’T 46, 49 (2004); see also Brief of Amici Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., supra note 193, at 16.
247
Brief of Amici Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., supra
note 193, at 16.
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problems” by minimizing paperwork and administrative burdens.
Even
Florida’s
Water
Management
District
administers
Environmental Resource Permitting programs that include general
permits for minor projects such as road resurfacing, dock
maintenance, mosquito control, underground cables, and utility
249
Nevertheless, critics of general permits argue that
infrastructure.
250
they provide insufficient public review and unfair special treatment.
Although general permit programs may not necessarily solve all of
the complex problems associated with regulating water diversion
facilities, they may be a step towards finding an equitable solution to
a testing dilemma.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is easily understood that actively discharging a pollutant from
a point source into a water of the United States without a permit
almost always violates the CWA. It is a more difficult question,
however, “when water is not altered chemically, physically,
biologically, or radiologically, by man, but is merely transported, by
251
man, from one water body to another.”
While this question may
seem very philosophical and abstract to some, it is quite real and
problematic for the multitude of facilities managing public water
supply systems, flood control, and navigation. Those in fear of ripple
effects will continue to debate the issue, but such arguments will only
be successful by falling on the ears of the legislature rather than the
courts. As Justice Stevens once stated, “[it] is not what a court thinks
is generally appropriate to the regulatory process, it is what Congress
252
intended.” Therefore, the ultimate resolution will inevitably reflect
Congress’ clear intention under the CWA of restoring and
maintaining the “chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
253
Nation’s waters.”

248

Id.
Rizzardi, supra note 245, at 72.
250
Id.
251
Rosemary J. Beless, Miccosukee: Can The Mere Transport of Unaltered Water Violate
the Clean Water Act?, 17 UTAH B.J. 12, 12 (2004).
252
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 (1977).
253
33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).
249

